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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we shed new light on the ways in which political trust is related to voting 
behaviour. Making use of the data of the Belgian Election Panel (2009-2014), we can take 
into account dynamics and how attitudes of distrust evolve over time. By showing that the 
low trusting are more likely to vote for protest parties, we confirm earlier research. 
Additionally, we point out that change in attitudes of distrust matters as well, as decreasing 
levels of trust significantly increase the probability that one votes for a protest party. Our 
results furthermore indicate that distrust and vote choices reinforce each other, leading to a 
spiral of distrust in which who voted for a protest party becomes even more distrusting of 
politics over time. 
 
KEYWORDS: Political trust; spiral of distrust; change in trust; Belgian Election Panel (BEP) 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A large and growing body of scholarly literature investigates the consequences of attitudes as 
political trust, satisfaction and political efficacy for electoral behaviour (Bélanger & Nadeau, 
2005; Hetherington, 1999; Marc Hooghe, Marien, & Pauwels, 2011; Kselman & Niou, 2010; 
Miller & Listhaug, 1990). These studies unequivocally point out that dissatisfied citizens are 
more likely to abstain from voting. In a context of compulsory voting – where abstaining is 
not a valid option – blank and invalid voting are strongly related to low levels of political trust 
(Hooghe et al., 2011). Furthermore, previous research offers convincing evidence that some 
parties succeed in attracting the ‘disgruntled’ voters. In multiparty systems more specifically, 
some parties benefit more from political distrust than others. For distrusting citizens, 
multiparty electoral contexts hence offer some alternatives to not turning out to vote. By 
voting for third parties, protest parties, extremist or populist parties it seems as if citizens have 
an option to voice their discontent (Bélanger & Nadeau, 2005; Hooghe et al., 2011; Miller & 
Listhaug, 1990).  
 
Most studies on the link between political trust and voting behaviour are correlational and 
show that low levels of trust are indeed associated with voting for protest parties. In this 
paper, we aim to move further this literature by not only looking at how one’s level of trust 
affects the vote choice, but also at how change in levels of trust relates to party preferences. 
The question driving this analysis is whether voters choose protest parties only when they are 
low trusting or whether becoming less trusting  – regardless of how trusting one is – already 
drives protest voting. 
 
Furthermore, moving beyond unidirectional hypotheses of how trust causes vote choices, a 
number of scholars have theorized on the opposite effect, of voting behaviour having an 
impact on political attitudes as well. With respect to this link, different expectations emerge 
from the literature. A first expectation is that protest parties merely benefit from pre-existing 
attitudes of dissatisfaction. A second expectation is that protest and populist parties do not 
(only) mobilize the dissatisfied but also fuel a sense of dissatisfaction in the electorate (Van 
der Brug, 2003). Third, it is argued that particular (protest) parties succeed in channelling 
dissatisfaction and by doing so stop or reverse an over-time decline of political trust (Miller & 
Listhaug, 1990). The cross-sectional data that have previously been used to shed light on this 
question do allow speculating about the directionality of this link, but panel-data are needed 
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for drawing strong inferences on how voting behaviour impacts on political attitudes 
(Bélanger & Aarts, 2006).  
 
In the current paper, we address this gap in the literature by investigating the dynamic relation 
between political trust and voting behaviour through the use of a panel design. Therefore, we 
make use of the data from the Belgian Election Panel (2009-2014), in which a representative 
sample of Belgian voters has been surveyed in the context of both the 2009 and the 2014 
elections in Belgium. Previous research has already shown that there is a strong link between 
political trust and voting for populist and extreme-right parties in Belgium (Hooghe et al., 
2011), which renders the Belgian context an interesting case for investigating this research 
puzzle on dynamic patterns as well.   
 
We first review the literature on the link between political trust and voting behaviour. Doing 
so, we have specific attention for how attitudes not only affect vote choices, but how vote 
choices can subsequently affect attitudes as well. We subsequently provide some more 
information on the Belgian electoral context, before presenting the data used and methods 
applied. After discussing the results from our analyses we end with some concluding remarks 
on the implications of our findings. 
 
2. POLITICAL TRUST AND VOTE CHOICES 
 
It is by now well established in the scholarly literature that levels of political trust affect 
voters’ party preferences. The first studies on this topic originated in the context of two-party 
systems and highlighted that low levels of political trust might be beneficial for the opposition 
party (Citrin, 1974). When more than two candidates or parties compete for election, 
however, dynamics are different. Hetherington (1999) has shown that if there is a viable third 
party, it is this party that attracts the distrusting – breaking the dominance of the two major 
parties in the United States. Similarly, political distrust has been found to be an important 
determinant of third party voting in the Canadian context as well (Bélanger & Nadeau, 2005). 
According to Miller and Listhaug (1990), how the distrusting vote depends on how flexible 
the party system is. If a party system is sufficiently open, protest parties can rise and attract 
votes among those with low levels of political trust.  
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This latter expectation is reflected in the literature that investigates at an individual level the 
link between the aggregate level trends of an alleged decline of political trust on the one hand 
(Hetherington, 1998; Norris, 1999) an a surge of populist and protest parties across Western 
democracies on the other (Arzheimer, 2009; Mudde, 2007, 2012; van Kessel, 2011). Attitudes 
of dissatisfaction and political distrust are indeed a recurrent theme in research analysing 
more closely what factors explain why voters choose protest or populist parties. A prime 
example in this regard is the Dutch case, where voting for the populist party List Pim Fortuyn 
has been shown to have been an expression of anti-partyism, political cynicism, low levels of 
political efficacy and political distrust (Belanger & Aarts, 2006; Schumacher & Rooduijn, 
2013; van der Brug, 2003). Even though all of these authors stress the relevance of policy 
positions and leader effects in voting for populist parties (either on the left or on the right) as 
well, it is clear that a vote for one of these parties is to some extent a protest vote (Ivarsflaten, 
2007). 
 
In the Belgian electoral context as well – where abstaining from voting is not a valid exit 
option for dissatisfied citizens – low levels of political trust are strongly linked to voting for 
populist or extreme right parties. In the context of the 2009 regional elections in the Flemish 
region, distrusting citizens were found to have a higher probability of voting for the populist 
List Dedecker (LDD), the extreme right Flemish Interest (VB) or the Flemish nationalist party 
(N-VA) (Hooghe et al., 2011). It seems, therefore, that a number of parties in the Flemish 
electoral sphere succeeded in “providing the disaffected with a means of representation” 
(Miller & Listhaug, 1990: 357). It should be noted that the Belgian political system consists 
of two separate party systems (Brack & Pilet, 2010). As there are viable protest parties in the 
Flemish electoral context only, we will focus on this region in the remainder of our paper.  
We expect to find the same voting patterns as observed for the 2009 elections as well, which 
is why we expect that higher levels of political trust decrease the probability of voting Vlaams 
Belang or N-VA.1 
 
H1:  The lower one’s level of political trust in 2014, the higher the probability of voting  
for protest parties. 
 
                                                        
1
 List Dedecker (LDD), that still obtained 7.6% of the votes in the 2009 regional elections, only ran in one 
electoral district in 2014 and is therefore not taken into account in the analyses.  
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The impact of political trust on voting behaviour is generally investigated in a static way, i.e., 
the effect of levels of trust on vote choices are looked at. A case could be made, however, for 
taking into account changes in trust levels as well. A first reason to think so is that voters can 
vote in a directional way (Rabinowitz & Macdonald, 1989). With respect to political trust, 
what matters for their vote choice would then not be their overall level of trust, but how their 
assessment of the political system has evolved over time. If voters have become less trusting 
in politics, the direction of how their attitudes changed would then lead them to choose a 
party mobilizing on distrust. Second, research in the field of economic voting offers 
convincing evidence that voters act retrospectively and take into account past performances of 
the incumbent (Fiorina, 1978; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2013). With respect to political trust 
as well, voters could be backward looking and be guided by their assessment of change over 
an electoral cycle. Our second hypothesis reads that change in trust levels affect voting 
behaviour, with stronger decreases in political trust being associated with a higher probability 
to vote for protest parties. 
 
H2:  The stronger one’s decrease of political trust over time, the higher the probability of 
voting for protest parties. 
 
Most of the research on the link between political trust and voting for populist parties is based 
on cross-sectional studies of a single election or repeated cross-sections. Such designs have 
provided evidence on the presence of a relation between political trust and voting behaviour, 
but do not shed light on directionality. In terms the role of political parties themselves, three 
different perspectives can be thought of. First, protest parties can be thought to merely attract 
dissatisfied voters and to offer an option for representation for the low trusting voters present 
in the electorate. Second, protest parties can – by channelling feelings of distrust within the 
electoral system – reduce political discontent. Such a role has been pointed at by Miller and 
Listhaug (1990). From a comparative analysis of trust and efficacy and voting behaviour in 
the United States, Sweden and Norway, they concluded that “in the flexible multi-party 
system of Norway, distrust was channelled back into the electoral arena as support for the 
opposition and protest parties of the right” (Miller & Listhaug, 1990: 382-383). At an 
aggregate level, the presence of protest parties in Norway is indeed associated with a decline 
of levels of political discontent, unlike the patterns observed in Sweden and the United States.  
Third, protest parties can act to ‘fuel’ political discontent. From his study of determinants of 
voting for List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) in the Netherlands van der Brug (2003) does conclude that 
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a preference for LPF aroused discontent rather than being driven by it. Bélanger and Aarts 
(2006: 16) are making use of panel-data and disagree with this point of view. Their analyses 
lead them to stress that a ‘reservoir of discontent’ already existed in the Netherlands, where 
the LPF successfully tapped into. Still, they as well find LPF supporters to become more 
cynical over time than voters of other parties. Following previous finding for the Dutch 
electoral context, we hypothesize that protest parties not only mobilize distrust, but 
additionally fuel distrust among their voters. 
 
H3: Citizens who voted for a protest party are becoming more distrusting over time than 
those who did not vote for protest parties. 
 
In sum, while it is an established fact that political distrust is associated with voting for 
protest or populist parties, questions remain on the evolution of trust over time and how that is 
related to voting behaviour. It is these research puzzles the current paper aims to gain insights 
into. 
 
3. DATA AND METHODS 
 
To assess the dynamic relation between political trust and voting for protest or populist 
parties, we employ the data from the Belgian Election Panel (BEP, 2009-2014). This panel 
survey is a representative survey of voters in the two main regions of Belgium (Flanders and 
Wallonia), based on a sample from the National Register. The 2009 part of the panel survey 
consisted of three survey waves, two of which were before the 2009 regional elections of 7 
June 2009 and one that was in the field shortly after.2 A total of 1,698 respondents took part in 
this post-electoral survey wave and were interviewed by phone, which is 35% of the original 
sample (PartiRep 2009). In the run-up to the 2014 elections of 25 May 2014, these 
respondents were contacted again to participate in the 2014 part of the panel study by means 
of a paper questionnaire. A total of 792 respondents who took part in the 2009 wave 3-survey 
sent back this paper questionnaire, which is 46.7% of the population of interest for the current 
analyses (48.5% if we take into account mortality). 
 
                                                        
2
. Post-electoral interviews took place between the end of June 2009 and the end of August 2009. 
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As a measure political trust, we make use of respondents’ indicated level of trust in the 
following institutions; political parties, the regional government, the regional parliament, the 
federal government, the federal parliament and politicians. For each of these institutions, 
respondents’ reported their level of trust on a scale from 0 (no trust at all) tot 10 (complete 
trust). As clear from the results in Table 1, for the Flemish panel-respondents, both in 2009 as 
well as in 2014 these six items load solidly on a one-dimensional scale. The mean values for 
political trust in Table 1 additionally point out that we can observe a decline in political trust 
between 2009 and 2014. This decline, from an average of 5.36 in 2009 to 4.84 in 2014 
additionally is observable for each single item included. Even though this is a marked decline, 
it is unsurprising, given the major political crisis the country went through between 2007 and 
2012, culminating in government formation process of 541 days following the 2010 federal 
elections (Marc Hooghe, 2012).   
 
Table 1. Measuring political trust  
 2009 (0-10) 2014 (0-10) 
Political parties 4.75 4.33 
Regional government 6.32 5.36 
Regional parliament 6.13 5.34 
Belgian government 5.13 4.88 
Belgian parliament 5.06 4.88 
Politicians 4.75 4.27 
Average 5.36 4.84 
Cronbach’s α 0.89 0.95 
Eigenvalue 3.82 4.72 
Explained variance (%) 63.69 78.72 
Source: Belgian Election Panel 2009-2014, N=421. 
 
Our first two hypotheses deal with how trust affects voters’ electoral choices. Our focus on 
the vote choice implies that our dependent variable of categorical nature, and distinguishes 
between different vote choice options in the 2014 elections. Therefore, we present the results 
of a series of multinomial regression models. As a reference category we take a vote for the 
Christian democratic party CD&V. The other outcome options are a vote for the green party 
(Groen!), a vote for the Flemish nationalist party (N-VA), a vote for the liberal party (Open 
VLD), a vote for the social-democrats (SP.a), a vote for the extreme-right party (Vlaams 
Belang) and a blank or invalid vote. We chose to present logit models, which do impose an 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property. In the context of our analyses, some 
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parties could be thought of as close alternatives, violating the IIA property. For practical 
applications, however, the simpler and easier to estimate logit models are often preferred and 
they tend to provide the same results as probit models (Dow & Endersby, 2004). 
 
We investigate the impact of political trust on vote choices while controlling for a number of 
socio-demographic control variables. More specifically, we control for respondents’ gender, 
age and their level of education. We distinguish between low levels of education (with no or 
less than a high school degree), middle levels (with only a high school degree) and high levels 
of education (with a higher education degree). 
 
Furthermore, we also investigate how attitudes of political trust evolve after voters casted a 
vote for a populist or protest parties. To test our third hypothesis, we hence explain the impact 
of having voted for such a party in 2009 on levels of political trust in 2014, while controlling 
for the 2014 level of political trust. For doing so, we run an OLS regression, in which we 
control for the same set of socio-demographic characteristics as included in the vote choice 
model as well.  
 
4. RESULTS 
 
Before investigating the over-time effects of political trust and voting for populist parties, we 
assess whether – as was the case in 2009 (Hooghe et al., 2011) levels of political trust are 
strongly correlated to preferring particular parties in 2014 as well. In Table 2, we present the 
results of a multinomial logistic regression, predicting the vote intention of the panel 
respondents in 2014. We control for the effect of gender, age and levels of education, but our 
main interest lies in the effect of political trust – as measured in 2014 – on preferring different 
parties. The results in Table 2 suggest that political trust is indeed significantly related to 
respondents’ party preferences. Higher levels of political trust significantly decrease the 
probability of intending to vote for the socialist party SP.a, the Flemish nationalist party N-
VA, the extreme-right Vlaams Belang and intending to cast a blank or invalid vote compared 
to intending to vote for the Christian democrats.  
 
As the coefficients obtained from a multinomial logit model are relative to the reference 
category and hence hard to interpret, in Figure 1 we also present the average adjusted 
predictions of intending to vote for each of the parties by different levels of political trust. The 
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results are in line with what was observed in 2009 as well. Low levels of political trust are 
associated with higher probabilities of voting N-VA, Vlaams Belang or casting a blank or 
invalid vote. The results offer support for our first hypothesis, as lower levels of politicual 
trust are indeed associated with higher probabilities of voting for protest parties. Even though 
the Flemish-nationalist party N-VA is not generally characterized as a protest party (Hooghe 
et al., 2011), the impact of distrust is strongest for this party. For the non-populist parties, 
there is hardly any impact of political trust at all, with the notable exception of CD&V. As 
respondents have a higher level of political trust, this strongly and significantly increases the 
probability that they intend to vote for the Christian democratic party in 2014. A possible 
explanation for this finding is that the party is perceived by Flemish voters as the main 
incumbent, regardless of whether or not it holds the office of prime minister (Hooghe & 
Dassonneville, 2012). 
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Table 2. Effect of political trust (2014) on vote intention in the Flemish region (probability of choosing party over CD&V) 
 Groen N-VA Open VLD SP.a Vlaams Belang Blank/invalid 
 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
Female (ref: male) -0.034 -0.797** 0.157 0.039 -0.406 -0.174 
 (0.393) (0.288) (0.352) (0.331) (0.541) (0.513) 
Age -0.035* -0.016 -0.034** -0.032** -0.059** -0.032 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.019) (0.018) 
Lower educated (ref: middle) -31.420 0.178 -0.218 0.636 1.322* 0.599 
 (3688778.400) (0.403) (0.555) (0.441) (0.625) (0.624) 
Higher educated (ref: middle) 1.249** 0.685* 0.285 0.080 -1.116 -0.539 
 (0.472) (0.325) (0.394) (0.389) (0.853) (0.669) 
Political trust (2014) -0.262 -0.707*** -0.248 -0.429*** -1.058*** -0.970*** 
 (0.149) (0.108) (0.132) (0.122) (0.163) (0.159) 
Constant 1.743 4.833*** 2.327* 3.407*** 6.378*** 4.836*** 
 (1.168) (0.847) (1.041) (0.966) (1.230) (1.245) 
N 440      
Pseudo-R2 0.121      
Source: Belgian Election Panel 2009-2014.  
Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Figure 1. Average adjusted predictions of intending to vote for each of the parties by political trust (2014) 
 
 
Source: Belgian Election Panel 2009-2014.  
Average adjusted predictions and 95%-confidence intervals obtained through margins-command in Stata after running mlogit model presented in Table 2.
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The descriptive statistics for political trust in Table 1 clarified that there was a decline in 
levels of political trust between 2009 and 2014. In a next step, we move beyond analysing the 
main effects of political trust on vote intention but assess how these changes in trust levels 
between 2009 and 2014 as well affect what parties voters prefer. Therefore, we add to the 
model presented in Table 2 respondents’ evolution of political trust between 2009 and 2014 
(Δ political trust). This indicator takes a positive value if respondents’ becoming more 
trusting in politics between 2009 and 2014 and a negative value if their level of trust in 
politics decreases. As the histogram of the distribution of this variable in Figure 2 illustrates, 
the predominant pattern among panel respondents is one of decreasing levels of trust in 
politics. 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of Δ political trust 2009-2014 
 
Source: Belgian Election Panel 2009-2014.  
 
The results of this multinomial regression analysis are presented in Table 3 and indicate that 
besides respondents’ level of political trust, the evolution of this attitude as well is clearly 
correlated to vote intentions. As levels of trust improved between 2009 and 2014, panel 
respondents became significantly less likely to intend voting for the N-VA, SP.a, Vlaams 
Belang or to cast a blank or invalid vote compared to voting for the Christian democratic 
party CD&V. 
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Table 3. Effect of political trust (2014) and evolution of political trust (2009-2014) on vote intention in the Flemish region (probability of 
choosing party over CD&V) 
 Groen N-VA Open VLD SP.a Vlaams Belang Blank/invalid 
 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
Female (ref: male) -0.033 -0.794** 0.159 0.041 -0.373 -0.209 
 (0.394) (0.289) (0.353) (0.332) (0.545) (0.516) 
Age -0.035** -0.017 -0.034** -0.033** -0.058** -0.033 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.019) (0.018) 
Lower educated (ref: middle) -35.450 0.146 -0.245 0.614 1.377* 0.520 
 (27392146.700) (0.404) (0.554) (0.441) (0.639) (0.626) 
Higher educated (ref: middle) 1.315** 0.738* 0.285 0.123 -0.942 -0.561 
 (0.477) (0.328) (0.398) (0.393) (0.862) (0.674) 
Political trust (2014) -0.411* -0.858*** -0.272 -0.537*** -1.324*** -0.933*** 
 (0.187) (0.136) (0.166) (0.154) (0.218) (0.223) 
Δ political trust (2009-2014) -0.176 -0.628*** -0.233 -0.367** -0.958*** -0.930*** 
 (0.162) (0.114) (0.141) (0.129) (0.171) (0.163) 
Constant 2.594 5.705*** 2.473* 4.047*** 7.670*** 4.790** 
 (1.333) (0.979) (1.199) (1.114) (1.407) (1.511) 
N 440      
Pseudo-R2 0.126      
Source: Belgian Election Panel 2009-2014.  
Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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As we have done for the main effect of political trust on vote intentions, we graphically 
present the estimated effect of Δ political trust on intending to vote for each of the parties as 
well. Figure 3 clarifies that similarly to what holds for levels of political trust, for change in 
trust-levels as well, effects are strongest for CD&V on the one hand and N-VA, Vlaams 
Belang and blank or invalid voting on the other. First, as voters become more trusting in 
politics between 2009 and 2014, this significantly increases their probability of voting for the 
Christian democratic party. The reverse is true for voting Vlaams Belang or casting a 
blank/invalid vote, although effects are only marginally significant for these options. For the 
Flemish nationalist party, we do observe that improving trust levels significantly decrease the 
probability that respondents intend to vote N-VA. 
 
The results offer support for our second hypothesis; not only are protest parties recruiting 
voters among the distrusting in the electorate, they also succeed in attracting voters who are 
becoming more distrustful over the course of an electoral cycle. The analyses hence indicate 
that low levels of political trust as well as a decline of trust both increase the probability of 
voting for protest parties. Levels of political trust hence need not necessarily be low for 
protest parties to benefit electorally. A decline of political trust is enough for voters to become 
more likely to vote for a protest party. 
 
The question that remains is what subsequently happens to voters who choose to vote for a 
protest party? Does voting for a protest party suffice as a way to channel dissatisfaction, 
leading to a stabilization of political trust among this electorate? Or doe protest parties further 
‘fuel’ distrust, as we hypothesized? 
 
In order to provide an answer to these questions, we run an OLS regression, explaining 
respondents’ change in political trust levels between 2009 and 2014. Besides the socio-
demographic variables gender, age and levels of education, we also control for voters’ level of 
political trust in 2009. Doing so, we take into account potential ceiling effects when 
investigating the evolution of attitudes of distrust over time. For assessing the impact of 
voting for a protest parties on change in levels of political trust, we add a series of dummy 
variables on respondents’ reported vote in the 2009 regional elections.  
 
 
 15 
Figure 3. Average adjusted predictions of intending to vote for each of the parties by Δ political trust (2009-2014) 
 
 
Source: Belgian Election Panel 2009-2014.  
Average adjusted predictions and 95%-confidence intervals obtained through margins-command in Stata after running mlogit model presented in Table 3.
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The results of this analysis are presented in Table 4. First, note that it is indeed important to 
control for the 2009 level of political trust. Higher levels of trust in 2009 quite logically lead 
to a significantly smaller increase in political trust between 2009 and 2014. 
 
Importantly, the results offer evidence for the thesis that protest parties are fuelling 
dissatisfaction. Respondents who voted for either the Flemish nationalist party N-VA or for 
Vlaams Belang had a significantly stronger decrease in trust between 2009 and 2014 
compared to those who voted CD&V in 2009. Additionally, even though the previous 
analyses indicated that lower levels of trust as well as a strong decrease of political trust are 
significantly correlated to casting a blank or invalid vote, the results in Table 4 do not indicate 
a similar ‘strengthening’ of distrust for those voters as what holds for who voted for a protest 
party.
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Table 4. Explaining Δ political trust (2009-2014) 
 
b 
(s.e.) 
Political trust 2009 -0.494*** 
 (0.061) 
Female (ref: male) 0.042 
 (0.162) 
Age 0.000 
 (0.005) 
Lower educated (ref: middle) -0.145 
 (0.226) 
Higher educated (ref: middle) 0.549** 
 (0.186) 
Party voted for in 2009 (ref: CD&V)  
Groen -0.255 
 (0.338) 
N-VA -0.687** 
 (0.231) 
SP.a -0.207 
 (0.243) 
Vlaams Belang -1.160** 
 (0.361) 
Open VLD -0.309 
 (0.274) 
Lijst Dedecker -0.361 
 (0.360) 
Blank/invalid -0.747 
 (0.902) 
Constant 2.214*** 
 (0.513) 
N 386 
R2 0.166 
Source: Belgian Election Panel 2009-2014.  
Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
 
In line with previous research, we find that low levels of political trust are associated with a 
higher probability of voting for a protest party. Furthermore, becoming more distrustful as 
well increases the probability of voting for a protest party. As levels of political trust are 
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deteriorating, protest parties not only electorally benefit from the fact that the pool of low 
trusting voters is growing, all the voters who are becoming less trusting are more likely to 
vote for these protest parties. If we want to understand how attitudes as political trust affect 
political behaviour, it is hence important not only to look at levels but to take into account 
changing attitudes as well. Future research should therefore pursue using panel-data to 
investigate dynamics with respect to political trust. Another option would be not to merely 
survey respondents about their level of trust in different institutions in cross-sectional studies, 
but also to ask participants to think of their level of trust retrospectively. 
 
Our findings furthermore hint at a ‘spiral of distrust’. Low levels of trust as well as decreasing 
levels of political trust increase the probability of voting for a protest party. Having chosen 
such a party subsequently acts to decrease one’s level of trust in politics even further. And 
this decrease can then be thought to strengthen the likelihood of voting for a protest party 
even further. The result is a spiral of distrust, where distrust and protest voting enforce each 
other. Miller and Listhaug (1990) were quite optimistic on how flexible party systems would 
allow protest parties to rise. Such parties, according to Miller and Listhaug, could channel 
dissatisfaction and stop the accumulation of discontent. What we observe in the Belgian 
multiparty system, is more in line with what van der Brug suggested to hold in the 
Netherlands as well; protest parties can act to ‘fuel’ discontent. 
 
Obviously, this study comes with a number of important limitations as well. First, the analysis 
is restricted to one particular case; the Flemish electoral context in the 2009-2014 period. 
Future research should hence clarify whether our observations can be generalized more 
broadly and to other than compulsory systems as well. The fact however, that for List Pim 
Fortuyn in the Netherlands as well previous research has pointed out a pattern of ‘fuelling’ 
discontent, suggests that what we observe is not a particularity of Flemish electoral politics. 
Second, even though we highlight the need to investigate the dynamics of the impact of 
political, the use of panel data also comes with some disadvantages, of which panel-attrition is 
definitely an essential one. Third, our results point out that those who voted for a protest party 
subsequently become more distrusting, but we can only speculate about the mechanism 
causing this pattern. More research, perhaps linking individual-level data with data on 
campaign coverage, is needed to enhance our knowledge of whether and how parties actively 
contribute to the spiral of distrust. 
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